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Caveats for the New Localism in Further Education - Why the use of Principal-Agent 
solutions at the local level will not work 
 
Abstract 
The post-incorporation Further Education (FE) sector has experienced a number of quasi-
markets over the past twenty three years designed to incentivise college agents (managers and 
lecturers) to meet government objectives. To create such quasi-markets Principal-Agent (P-A) 
solutions have been introduced in the form of a series of funding incentives and inspection 
frameworks under the Conservative administration (1993- 1997), New Labour (1997-2010), 
the Coalition government (2010-2015) and currently under the new Conservative 
administration. This paper reviews the FE literature to assess the effectiveness of these P-A 
solutions as a means of improving students’ skills for employability, needs-based equity for 
disadvantaged students and the wider benefits of education. The conclusion is that such P-A 
solutions have been ineffective at realising these goals because distant government diktats are 
unable to accommodate local knowledge of communities and businesses, leading to the 
creation of incomplete contracts which limit professional values, intrinsic motivation and tacit 
knowledge in the production process. Centralised funding incentives and inspection 
frameworks have also led to gaming behaviours and impression management activity as a 
means of presenting colleges as auditable commodities. More particularly, P-A solutions have 
encouraged a performative culture where students are viewed as commodities (of financial and 
presentational value) to the detriment of both needs-based equity for disadvantaged learners 
and student employability. Significant caveats are provided in this paper for the current 
Conservative government to consider in its planned policy of improving skills for 
employability through localism and devolution in the FE sector. It suggests that if single-
minded P-A solutions are used at the local level, through the continued use of funding and 
inspection targets and incentives, they will not improve skills for employability or needs-based 
equity for disadvantaged students, nor will they facilitate a regard for the wider benefits of 
education due to the creation of incomplete contracts. New forms of local governance and 
accountability will be required to facilitate more flexible Principal-Agent relations which 
accommodate decision-making, intrinsic motivation and professional values at the local level. 
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Caveats for the New Localism in Further Education- Why the use of Principal-Agent 
solutions at the local level will not work 
 
Introduction 
Orthodox economics assumes a genus of man called homo economicus or economic man. Such 
a man is essentially motivated by money (or material wealth).  The policy prescription, if we 
assume self-interested behaviour and exogenous motivation, is given in the economics 
literature as one based on Principal-Agent (P-A) theory (or Agency Theory) in which 
asymmetry of information (in terms of cost, quality and effort) is addressed through incentive 
contracts provided by the principal, leading to the agent increasing effort and revealing 
previously concealed information (Dixit 1999). Government policy from the Incorporation of 
colleges in 1993 onwards has been predicated on the orthodox P-A assumption of self-
interested, utility-maximising agents (i.e. college managers and lecturers) requiring incentives 
to direct them towards government objectives. In particular, the incorporation of colleges (the 
outcome of the 1992 Higher and Further Education Act) led to a shift from  monopolistic state 
provision to a quasi-market in which it was assumed funding and inspection incentives would 
direct self-interested college agents (managers and lecturers) towards government objectives 
(Le Grand 1993; Le Grand and Bartlett 1993). Within this context, a new form of governance, 
what Ball refers to as ‘controlled decontrol’ (Ball 2008 41), in which steering from the centre, 
through contracts and targets, rather than rowing (through traditional bureaucracies), became 
the norm.  
 
In this article the post-incorporation FE literature is reviewed to assess the extent to which the 
policy of funding and inspection incentives, predicated on P-A theory, has been effective, and 
to consider its likely effectiveness as a policy tool within the Conservative administration’s 
current plans for increased localism and devolution within the FE sector. 
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 The main goal of economic models such as P-A theory is to improve efficiency (i.e. to improve 
the relationship between education inputs and outputs). More specifically, increased technical 
efficiency would involve an improvement in education outputs (in particular government 
objectives such as improving skills for employability) for a given level of inputs, whilst an 
increase in price efficiency would involve a reduction in unit costs, for a given level of output 
(Monk 1990).  
 
In analysing the impact of P-A solutions on FE Colleges this paper also has a concern for the 
extent to which colleges, in responding to government diktats and targets, also have a regard 
for the wider benefits of education and thus the needs of society (what economists refer to as 
exchange efficiency). To what extent has a desire to achieve government objectives led college 
lecturers to ‘teach to the test’ or focus resources on achieving PIs and targets in FE, at the 
expense of the wider benefits of education? Such benefits (externalities or ‘spillover effects’ in 
economics, so called because they spill over to the broader society) have a positive impact on 
exchange efficiency and relate to cultural benefits external to the consumer such as citizenship,  
social cohesion and political awareness  (Psacharopoulos and Woodhall 1991).  
 
A final concern relates to the impact of P-A solutions on equity in the FE Sector.  Equity is 
essentially concerned with what represents the ‘most fair’ distribution of what is produced.  
There are a number of possible value laden approaches to what is equitable provision but the 
focus of this article is on needs-based equity which may be defined as an: 
 
… egalitarian approach to social and educational inclusion which 
aims to focus funding on the most marginal groups and to 
redistribute it towards further education in order to widen 
participation in education and training. 
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                                                             (Hodgson and Spours 1999 17) 
In examining the impact of financial and inspection incentives on FE Colleges this article is 
critical of the use of P-A solutions in FE policy. A distinction should be made, however, 
between single-minded P-A solutions and P-A theory (Dixit 2002). Single-minded solutions 
assume basic information asymmetries and narrow definitions of self-interested college 
agents. Such single-minded (and silver bullet) solutions in the public sector are also criticised 
by P-A theorists such as Dixit (2002) who argue for more regard for professional values and 
intrinsic motivation if P-A theory is to be of value to policy (Dixit 2002,  697). Single-minded 
principal agent solutions in the public (and FE) sector contrast with P-A theory: a positivist 
research methodology which aims to determine the incentives which most effectively direct 
agents towards the goals of the Principal through a regard for moral hazard and adverse 
selection (see below). Unlike single-minded P-A solutions P-A theory is based on empirical 
evidence and may have a regard for multiple stakeholders and motivations beyond self-interest 
(Levacic, 2009).   
 
Whilst we are mostly critical of single-minded P-A solutions in FE (as a means of meeting the 
needs of multiple tasks and stakeholders at the local level) a specific criticism of the positivist 
P-A research methodology underlying funding and inspection incentives in FE also relates to 
its view of college lecturers and managers as atomised rather than politically and socially 
embedded agents (Granovetter 1985) which, in turn, has had the effect of limiting the 
productive potential of learning cultures and communities of practice in FE (Scaife 2004; Lucas 
2004; James and Biesta, 2007).  
 
In analysing the impact of P-A theory underlying FE policy this paper does not measure 
efficiency in the orthodox way (quantitatively and through the use of counterfactuals). Instead 
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it looks inside the black box of the FE College, and qualitatively assesses the impact of 
inspection and funding incentives (with reference to the FE literature) through the application 
of Leibenstein’s theory of X-inefficiency. X-inefficiency is the difference between the actual 
output from an input and the maximum output attributable to that input, with such a difference 
assumed to be the product of motivational deficiencies in the firm’s (or College’s) hierarchy 
(Leibenstein 1978). The use of X-inefficiency facilitates a regard for the impact of incentives 
on lecturer and manager self-interest, intrinsic motivation and professional values. In 
particular, it allows an analysis of the extent to which funding and inspection incentives in FE 
have facilitated the utilization of these productive motivational inputs in line with the human 
capital requirements of business (technical efficiency) at minimum unit cost (price efficiency), 
needs-based equity for disadvantaged learners and the wider benefits of education (exchange 
efficiency). 
 
Analysis of the impact of P-A solutions on efficiency and equity is also situated more broadly 
within the conceptual framework of ‘New Economic Sociology’ (NES) which may be defined 
as the study of the social organisation of economic phenomena. Economic Sociology has a 
concern for both equity and efficiency, with these measured through the impact of processes 
(the traditional realm of sociology) on outcomes (the realm of economics).  This focus, unlike 
orthodox economics however, is on understanding economic phenomena in its social and 
cultural contexts, an epistemology which recognises the importance of norms and values, trust, 
networks and social capital. New Economic Sociology also highlights the need to incorporate 
a regard for the political embeddedness of economic behaviour, and thus the impact of policy 
(e.g. local governance in FE) on agent (i.e. lecturer and manager) behaviour in colleges 
(Granovetter, 1985). 
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Whilst analysis in this paper of the effectiveness of P-A solutions is historical, it provides 
important caveats for the current Conservative administration to consider in the design of its 
new policy of localism and devolution, which is intended to shift decisions regarding the supply 
of employability skills from the centre to the local level. Analysis in this paper supports such 
localism but argues that for such localism to be effective there will need to be a significant shift 
away from the current low-trust Principal Agent solutions manifest in funding and monitoring 
systems, driven by marketization and managerialism, towards more flexible accountability 
arrangements such that government strategy is shared with localities through more 
decentralised forms of governance (Keep, 2016). Localism should also have a wider policy 
remit than the current policy focus on employability skills so that the needs of communities in 
terms of needs-based equity and the wider benefits of education may also be met. 
 
1. Funding and inspection incentives between 1993 and 2015 
As argued above, the design of funding and inspection incentives in FE to improve technical 
and price efficiency, is predicated on orthodox P-A theory. This includes Moral hazard, a term 
used by P-A theorists to describe a situation where the principal does not know how much 
effort is required to produce a given output. In these circumstances the principal (assuming 
agent self-interest) has to consider what incentive structure is conducive to increased output, 
whilst controlling for other factors which also impact on outputs (such as pupil characteristics) 
(Le Grand 2003). The problem of adverse selection relates to a situation where the agent has 
important information that the principal cannot access. Incentives are designed to elicit the 
truth (referred to as the revelation principle) which, if successful, causes the agent to share the 
economic surplus (rent) that exists in the relationship, and provide information that informs 
subsequent contracting decisions (Dixit 2002). 
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Under the Conservative administration (1993-1997), and the first five years of New Labour’s 
administration (1997-2002), the Further Education Funding Council’s (FEFC) formula funding 
methodology was the key means of addressing moral hazard within FE. This emphasized a 
concern for both technical efficiency (increasing outputs: in particular the number of students 
enrolled and retained on their courses) and price efficiency (reducing unit costs) by only 
funding student success in terms of enrolment, retention and achievement (Lucas 1999). This 
was predicated on a particular view of the previous LEA historical funding approach - that a 
lack of incentives acting on utility-maximising college agents had caused organizational slack 
leading to poor student retention and achievement in the sector (Audit Commission/Ofsted 
1993).   
 
Technical efficiency, under the FEFC, was thought to be realizable through the incentives (or 
funding signals) built into the formula funding methodology encouraging colleges to increase 
the quantity of outputs in terms of the larger volume of 16-19 year olds in the system, who 
needed to be retained and to achieve if funding units were to be realized. Improved price 
efficiency, it was thought, would also be encouraged because, unlike the previous LEA 
‘historical’ approaches to funding, student dropout and failure to achieve would lead to a claw 
back of funds (Lucas 1999). Further improvements to price efficiency were further thought 
realizable through convergence in the average level of funding (the ALF), or unit cost of 
provision, which under LEA ‘historical’ funding approaches had been wide ranging, and 
technical efficiency through growth targets for expanding provision; in particular the DLE 
(Demand-Led Element) encouraged growth in colleges which derived £6.50 (a third of the 
ALF) for all units generated above the total number forecasted in the college’s strategic plan 
(McClure 2000). This, combined with 90% core funding (core funding was calculated at 90% 
of the previous year’s total each year from 1993 to 2002), meant colleges had to expand 
9 
 
provision just to receive the same level of funds as the previous year (FEFC 2001). Adverse 
selection was also addressed through the incentive structure which revealed cost structures 
through 90% funding, the Demand Led Element, and convergence in funding. The result was 
the achievement of government objectives in terms of an increased volume of students in FE, 
at reduced cost (McClure 2000). This, however, as discussed in more depth in section 2 below, 
did not equate to an increase in technical efficiency as the increase in volume of students was 
achieved through a decrease in the quality of education; in particular through the certification 
of lower quality work to meet student retention and achievement targets and to maximize 
funding units (Gravatt, 1997; Ainley, 1999, Ainley and Allen 2010). The significance of this 
for the Conservative administration’s current agenda of localism relates to the potential use of 
skills targets at the local level, linked to (decreasing levels of) funding, incentivizing colleges 
to  increase the quantity of students certified through gaming behaviours and a reduction in the 
quality of education outputs. Such behaviour may be required to secure funding for survival in 
the education market, but it would not equate to improved efficiency. 
 
Under the Conservative administration (1993-1997) quality assurance and inspection 
procedures were also introduced to complement the FEFC formula funding methodology as a 
policy for remedying the problem of asymmetric information in the sector and to redress the 
lack of concern for the quality of education within the funding regime. To this end the FEFC 
inspected colleges on a four-year cycle, provided a three month period of notice for inspections 
and based inspections on colleges’ annual self-assessment reports. FEFC inspections, however, 
section 3 below will explain, were ineffective at addressing poor quality provision as this was 
hidden through impression management activity and rituals of performance as a further means 
of college survival within the FE quasi-market (Elliot, 1996; Lumby, 2001). 
The assumptions of P-A theory underlying FE policy continued under New Labour (1997-
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2010).  An increased focus on planning, however, led to more centralisation, with funding 
incentives used as the key means for directing colleges towards realising New Labour’s 
economic agenda of meeting the human capital needs of business and needs-based equity for 
disadvantaged students (Hodgson and Spours 1999). Centralisation, under New Labour, was 
intensified in 2002 through the new state-purchasing agency – the Learning and Skills Council 
(LSC) – which increased funding associated with student achievement for 16-19 year olds 
(LSC 2002a) (10% of the base rate as compared to 7% under the FEFC). Further funding was 
also available subject to agreeing a three year development plan with the LSC built around the 
goals of increased customer focus, consistent high quality teaching and learning, and 
developing the capability of the college workforce (Success for all, LSC 2002b). In this way 
adverse selection was also addressed, through incentives designed to reveal information on the 
quality of teaching and learning.  
 
Still more incentives to improve teaching and learning were introduced under New Labour on 
1st April 2001 through a new inspectorate: the Office for Standards in Education (Ofsted), 
which replaced the FEFC as the institution responsible for ensuring quality and accountability 
of teaching and learning in the FE sector. Crucial to achieving a good Ofsted inspection grade 
on a four-point scale (1; outstanding, 2; good, 3; satisfactory, 4; unsatisfactory) was a college’s 
retention, achievement and success rates compared to national benchmarks (national averages). 
Such benchmarks, in not incorporating a regard for the impact of student input characteristics 
on student attainment (e.g. the disadvantage of working class students in terms of social and 
cultural capital and material deprivation), were remiss in not adopting a value added approach, 
with this, as we shall see in section 2, creating the context for gaming behaviours to manipulate 
achievement and success rate PIs for course survival within the FE quasi-market (Smith, 2007; 
Boocock, 2014). Research on FE also suggests that X-inefficiency increased during this period 
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due to college conformity to the LSC and Ofsted creating an audit culture which undermined 
the productive potential of learning communities within colleges (Biesta and James, 2007). A 
key question for the current Conservative administration to consider relates to the role of Ofted 
within its strategy of localism and devolution as a means of meeting the human capital needs 
of businesses (Keep, 2016), in light of a significant body of research which suggests that the 
response of colleges to Ofsted is one of institutional conformity rather than improved efficiency 
(Bathmaker et al. 2003; Smith and Bailey, 2005; Kelly, 2005; Boocock, 2010, O’Leary, 2015). 
 
Needs-based equity was also addressed by New Labour in 2002 through a disadvantage funding 
uplift of 10% for enrolling basic skill learners or those students living in deprived areas (based 
on home address post codes), and a higher disadvantage uplift of 12% for enrolling those people 
living in supported accommodation registered with the local authority, provided by registered 
charities or housing associations (LSC 2002a). Section 3 below discusses how this objective 
of needs-based equity was significantly undermined in colleges by its other objective of 
improved success rates. In particular, it created the incentive for colleges to enrol 
disadvantaged students onto undemanding programmes of study as a means of improving 
success rates at the expense of the employability of such students (Wolf 2010). 
 
The Coalition government’s (2010-2015) key objective in the funding of 14-19 year olds 
(through the Department for Education - DfE) and adult provision (through the Skills Funding 
Agency - SfA) was narrower than New Labour in its’ focus on developing the employability 
skills of young people and cutting costs. This included incentives for private sector companies 
to enroll employees onto courses provided in either the public or private sector, with the 
objective one of shifting the focus of the FE sector away from supply to meeting the demand 
for human capital (Keep and Mayhew 2013; Nash and Jones 2015).  
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 The key criticism of this policy, addressed in more detail below in section 2, relates to the 
negative impact on efficiency and equity of government funding used by businesses to certify 
older employees’ existing skills at the expense of both the skills of younger employees and the 
higher level technical skills required by industry (Lupton et al. 2015; Wolf 2015). A further 
criticism of the Coalition’s funding of FE relates to the 24% decrease in funding of non-HE 
post-19 education between 2010 and 2014 (Keep and Mayhew 2013) which also impacted 
negatively on needs-based equity for disadvantaged adults. 
 
Further incentives to address moral hazard were intensified by Ofsted under the Coalition 
administration through a change in the descriptor ‘satisfactory’ to ‘requires improvement’, and 
the requirement that colleges improve from ‘requires improvement’ to ‘good’ within two re-
inspections or be labelled ‘inadequate’. ‘No notice’ visits and a closer focus on senior 
managers’ role in driving continuous improvement (to address adverse selection) were 
additional means by which college agents were incentivized to realize government objectives 
(Ofsted 2012).   
 
In section 2 below we critique the single-minded P-A solutions discussed above. The key 
conclusion that centralized P-A solutions lead to incomplete contracts lends support to the 
current Conservative government’s intended policy shift from central control to localism and 
devolution. It further suggests, however, that for such localism and devolution to be effective 
the Conservative administration will also need to shift away from its current ideology of 
marketization, managerialism and single-minded P-A solutions, towards more flexible P-A and 
accountability arrangements such that government strategy is genuinely shared with localities 
(Keep 2016). 
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2. X-inefficiency and  incomplete contracts in the Further Education sector 
It has been suggested that improved measures of performance in the FE sector are the product 
of the above funding formulae and college inspection regimes incentivising college agents to 
improve induction, recruitment, on-programme support and tracking of student progress 
(Ainley and Bailey 1997; Leney, Lucas and Taubman 1998; Lucas 1999; Hyland and Merrill 
2002; Alton et al. 2007; Hodgson et al. 2015). Certainly, in New Labour’s first two terms 
(1997- 2005) success rates increased from 53% in 1998/99 to 72% in 2003/04 (Foster 2005) and 
77% in 2005-06 (Coffield et al. 2008). The number of 19-year olds with level 2 qualifications 
increased to almost 70% in 2006 and 1.6 million adults improved their basic skills through 
Skills for Life.  This continued in New Labour’s third term, with success rates for General FE 
and tertiary colleges for 16-18 year olds 77.3%, 78.3%, 79.1% in 2007/08, 2008/09 and 
2009/10 respectively, and for students aged 19 and over 79.9%, 80% and 79.4%.  Under the 
Coalition government success rates increased for 16-18 year olds to 81.6% and 84.1% in 
2010/11 and 2011/12 respectively, and for students aged 19 and over 81% and 84.3% over the 
same period (SfA 2013). The success rate for all students in 2013/14 was calculated at 83.6% 
(SfA 2014).  
The link suggested, between funding, inspection and education outcomes, however, is 
predicated on the assumption that measures of performance used in FE are valid and objective 
proxy measures of education outcomes. Such an assumption, we argue below, is tenuous in 
light of the more extensive FE research which suggests that improved measures of performance 
are the product of gaming behaviours and student certification rather than learning in the sector. 
14 
 
Gaming behaviours in the early post-incorporation period, under the FEFC, included ‘unit 
farming’, (alternatively referred to as ‘nesting’, ‘tariff farming’ or ‘additionality’) which  
involved extra funding units being derived not from enrolling extra students, nor by retaining 
them, but by entering them onto extra qualifications connected to their main course of study 
(Gravatt 1997). Such ‘unit farming’ was not a pedagogical policy based on student need, but a 
management policy cynically deployed to maximise funding units only. The policy, at its 
extreme, led to a 100 per cent increase in funding units at one college whilst student numbers 
actually dropped (Perry 1997). The ultimate way of ‘playing the system’ was through 
franchising. This was a way for colleges to exploit the demand-led element of the formula 
funding methodology through arrangements with employers to deliver courses on their 
premises, and in doing so to expand provision at lower marginal cost (a third of the ALF). The 
central problem to franchised provision was that it created incentives for colleges to receive 
money from the FEFC for provision which would have been provided anyway by the private 
sector (Nash 1995). Clearly franchising of this kind, in generating extra funding units for 
colleges and redistributing public finance to the private sector, with no real increase in 
provision for students, represented a policy which was neither technically nor price inefficient 
(Lucas, 1999). 
 
New Labour’s continued use of single-minded P-A approaches in the funding of 
apprenticeships led to a similar ‘playing the system’. Between 2002/3 and 2009/10 there was a 
67 per cent increase in apprenticeships, from 170,000 to 280,000, and between 2006/7 and 
2009/10 a 273% increase in workplace learning, from 200,000 to 600,000 (Lupton et. al. 2015). 
70% of apprenticeships, however, were not undertaken by new trainees but existing employees. 
As such, much of the workplace budget was used to fund training that employers would have 
provided without public funds.  
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 Such technical and price inefficiency continued under the Coalition government’s funding of 
adult apprenticeships. The financial incentives, government targets and lack of accountability, 
Wolf (2015) argues, allowed non-college (i.e. private) providers to certify experienced 
employees who did not require support or teaching materials, at the expense of ‘more 
expensive’ new employees who did need such support. Wolf (2015) also highlights how 
apprenticeships were in areas that were less expensive to provide rather than the highly 
qualified technicians required by the labour market. One further perverse, inefficient, 
inequitable and unintended outcome of financial incentives related to the reduction in 
apprenticeships started by 16-18 year-olds from 60% of the total in 2005 to 22% in 2013/14 
(Wolf 2015).  
 
The significant lesson to take from these findings is that the current Conservative 
administration’s strategy of localism and devolution, should not include single-minded P-A 
solutions due to the creation of incomplete contracts and unintended perverse outcomes. In 
section 3 we outline the alternative more collaborative, ecological policy advocated by 
Hodgson and Spours (2015) which would mitigate incomplete contracts and perverse outcomes 
through the replacement of incentives (acting on self-interest) with  collaboration (acting on 
communities of practice and professionalism) in the interest of multiple stakeholders. 
 
Success rates in the FE sector may also only be considered a proxy measure for increased 
technical efficiency if such measures equate to improved education outcomes. A key caveat 
relates to the potential for increased achievement and success rates to be realised through 
gaming behaviours rather than improved teaching and learning. Ainley’s research (1999) 
indicated that the FEFC funding incentives had led to a qualification inflation (‘education by 
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numbers’) and a certified society rather than a learning one. More specifically pass rates were 
achieved through increased student plagiarism and ghost-writing or through students 
approaching qualifications as ‘simple exercise in information processing’ (Ainley and Allen, 
2010, 48). Ainley and Allen (2010), more recently, substantiate this claim with reference to 
the Kings College, London and University of Durham research (Guardian, 2009) which found 
no increased understanding of Maths, despite the significant increased numbers of students 
achieving A*- C GCSE  grades between 1984 and 2009. 
Boocock’s five-year ethnographic study of a single FE College (2014) also revealed how 
success rates may be improved without any associated improvement in the quality of 
education. In particular, increased success rates on vocational courses were achieved through 
‘criteria chasing’ (Spours, Coffield and Gregson 2006), a process which involved staff 
marking student work repetitively until all criteria are met, with this facilitated by pressure 
from senior managers on middle managers and, in turn, middle managers on lecturing staff to 
ensure the national benchmark was achieved.  In this respect the introduction of success rates 
and benchmarks had encouraged dysfunctional principal-agent relations between managers 
and lecturers, with the use of success rates not about truthfulness, regarding education 
improvement, but with turning the department into an ‘auditable commodity’ (Shore and 
Wright 1999, 570, cited in Ball 2001, 11). More specifically, the focus was not on genuine 
effectiveness (New Labour’s skills and egalitarian agenda) but on the appearance of 
effectiveness – effectiveness for the market and for Inspection (Ball, 2001; Smith, 2007).  
 
The limitations of success rates are now understood by policy-makers. Indeed, the previous 
Coalition government, through the Department for Education (DfE), in response to the review 
of FE by Alison Wolf (2010), removed success rates from the funding formula because of a 
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view that they incentivise colleges to enrol students onto unchallenging courses to improve 
achievement. Success rates were also removed from the Ofsted inspection framework in light 
of a belated awareness that benchmarks do not have an adequate regard for how success rate 
benchmarks may be more easily achieved with higher ability students and less easily with 
disadvantaged students. The rhetoric has been one of increased recognition of the impact of 
prior attainment, socio-economic factors and local employment rates on student attainment 
within Ofsted’s judgement of colleges (Ofsted 2012).  The Department of Business Information 
and Skills (BIS) has also emphasised its intent to shift its focus from success rates alone towards 
a concern for longer-term outcomes such as student destination, employment and earnings 
(Fletcher et al. 2015). 
It is highly probable, however, given the history of funding incentives in FE, that any new 
incentives introduced by the Conservative administration in its policy of localism and 
devolution will likely lead to further unintended dysfunctional outcomes. A recent example is 
the removal of success rates from the funding formula, which puts an increased emphasis on 
student retention. This is designed to prevent the perverse incentive created by the LSC funding 
formula relating to the recruitment of students onto unchallenging courses to ensure high 
success rates (DfE 2012). To further encourage recruitment with integrity, student withdrawal 
at any point, in the new funding system, will only realise 50% funding for colleges. Whilst this 
is designed to incentivise colleges to recruit the right students onto the right courses to optimise 
student retention (and funding) a new perverse incentive, given the political context of 
austerity, cost-cutting, and competition for students, might be one of enrolling less able 
students and thereafter ‘criteria chase’ (Spours, Coffield and Gregson 2006) (in other words 
endless marking and remarking of student work) to maintain student retention and, in turn, 
optimise college funding.  
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A further concern regarding the impact of single-minded P-A solutions in FE, relates to the 
question of whether or not an increased volume of lower standard qualifications is what is 
needed to meet the needs of the disadvantaged in colleges. If qualification success is the result 
of qualification inflation and lowering standards to maximise funding and measures of 
performance what does this mean for needs-based equity? The answer would appear to be that 
needs-based equity has not been improved through funding and inspection incentives in Further 
Education. Socio-economic gaps remain wide in the UK and they increase as children progress 
through the education system (Norris and Francis 2014), with children from middle class 
families able to benefit from social and cultural capital (Ainley and Allen 2010). Wolf (2010) 
explains how, under New Labour, this was compounded by a quarter of vocational education 
courses in Further Education not providing students aged 16-19 with prospects for employment 
or progression to HE. In 2013/14 the SFA removed 2,800 of these qualifications and in 2014/15 
5,000 qualifications. Whilst these qualifications enabled colleges to achieve success rates, they 
failed to provide learners with progression routes into either employment or University 
(Lupton, Unwin and Thomas 2015), a situation self-evidently not in line with either improved 
needs-based equity or technical efficiency.  
The view that funding incentives under New Labour led to improved needs-based equity was 
further brought into question by the UK’s position of 25th out of 29 rich countries in 2010 for 
the number of NEETS (15-19 year-olds not in education, employment or training), its position 
of 18th out of 30 OECD countries in 2009 for the percentage of adults attaining a level 2 
qualification, and adult numeracy skills significantly below the OECD average in 2011/12 
(Lupton, Unwin and Thomas 2015).  
 
Under the Coalition government (2010-2015) the use of single-minded P-A theory in FE may 
be particularly criticized for its impact on needs-based equity for disadvantaged adult learners. 
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More specifically, a narrow focus on developing (and funding) the employability skills of 16-
19 year olds was at the expense of adult learners, with free study for adults on level 2 courses 
up to the age of 26, and level 3 up to age of 23, replaced with loans. This risked destroying 
adult education in FE which had been on a decline anyway, as a result of the 2003 skills strategy 
under New Labour which emphasised and funded adult literacy and numeracy skills rather than 
non-vocational learning. Adult participation in FE, as a result, dropped from 3,480,000 in 
2002/3 to 1,500,000 in 2012/13. There has been a further drop in participation of adults aged 
over 24 studying level 3 and 4 qualifications from 400,000 in 2012/13 to 57,000 in 2013/14, 
caused by the replacement of free study with loans (Perry and Davies 2015). Such a policy is 
at odds with the public sector ethos which historically also had a concern for disadvantaged 
learners and education provision beyond the ‘human capital’ requirements of employers 
(Coffield et al., 2008). It is unlikely that the current planned policy of localism and devolution, 
will redress the inequity of disadvantaged adult learners if, as the November 2015 spending 
review indicates, loans for adults are extended further to include all students aged 19-23 
studying qualifications from level 3 to 6 (Kaczmarczyk 2016). 
Needs-based equity for 18 year olds was also undermined, under the Coalition government, by 
a 17.5% cut in funding for 18 year olds relative to 16/17 year olds from 2014/15, impacting on 
150,000 students (Isles, 2013), many from disadvantaged ethnic minority groups (Evans, 
2013), and needs-based equity for students with learning difficulties was weakened through 
the removal of additional learning support for students up to the age of 18 which had been 
funded by the EfA. LEAs were charged with funding this support instead (extended up to the 
age of 25) but were unable, given their own significant cut backs, to provide the same level of 
provision as the EFA for students with learning disabilities (UCU 2013).  
 
Overall, spending on FE between 2009/10 and 2013/14, whilst maintained in cash terms, 
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equated to a £1.2 billion or 10% cut in real terms (Lupton, Unwin and Thomas, 2015). Such a 
decrease in the Further education budget as a percentage of the total education budget was  
based on the view that there are higher returns from investing in HE than FE and that the higher 
earnings of graduates equates to increased productivity. This view erroneously conflates 
relative advantage with concrete productivity, as earnings can rise for the more highly educated 
without an increase in productivity, as is currently the case in the UK (Wolf, 2015). This 
suggests, on both egalitarian and efficiency grounds, that the declining funding of the FE sector 
as a percentage of the total education budget should be reversed within the Conservative 
government’s planned policy of localism, to enable the sector to shift from low level vocational 
qualifications to higher technical level qualifications to meet the needs of the labour market. In 
this way, investment in vocational education would also improve needs-based equity through 
increased funding for disadvantaged learners (Wolf 2015). 
A further significant negative effect of funding and inspection incentives, predicated on single-
minded P-A theory, also relates to the prioritising of skills for employability over  a regard for 
the wider benefits of education and exchange efficiency. In the early post incorporation period, 
for instance, consumer (i.e. student) instrumentalism in FE, and the need to meet funding 
targets for survival, caused colleges to focus on ‘key transferable skills’ at the expense of the 
wider social purposes of education (Ainley, 1999). The need to meet centralised targets and 
benchmarks under New Labour continued to cause inertia in colleges at the expense of the 
innovation required to meet the needs of learners and local communities. To redress this Lucas 
(2004) argued for a less controlling, more decentralised, approach to funding so that the 
curriculum may be developed in accordance with local Business and community needs rather 
than distant LSC directives.  
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Under the Coalition administration funding drivers introduced by the SfA also failed to 
recognise the value of the wider benefits of lifelong learning which:   
Boosts individuals’ skills and strengthens communities and 
contributes to better health and wellbeing. Research shows that 
where people are engaged in adult learning there are positive 
outcomes for health in relation to smoking, cancer, obesity and 
general wellbeing. It is not only good for individuals but a 
positive saving for the NHS (Dakin 2013, 30) 
 
There would appear to be clear limitations to policy based on P-A (Principal-Agent) theory for 
the current Conservative administration to consider in its planned policy of localism and 
devolution - notably the difficulty of determining incentives given the multi-task and multi-
principal nature of Further Education, and poorly observable goals. If the Conservative 
administration, in developing a policy of localism, is to meet the needs of businesses and 
disadvantaged students more regard for local knowledge, professional values and intrinsic 
motivation will be required (Dixit 2002, 697). A shift in policy from central diktats and funding 
and inspection incentives (which create incomplete contracts) to local decision-making may 
facilitate this, but localism and devolution will be required to go beyond the current focus on 
the human capital requirements of business if incomplete contracts are to be avoided; in 
particular it will also be required to consider issues of equity at the local level and the wider 
benefits of education such as the emotional development of students, health issues, society and 
citizenship (Dixit 2002, 718).  
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3. Principal-Agent relations between policy-makers and senior managers 
In this section the impact of single-minded P-A solutions on relations between policy-makers 
and senior managers is highlighted as a significant causal mechanism for the inefficiencies and 
inequities discussed in previous sections.  
The use of single-minded P-A solutions in the FE sector has consistently privileged rational 
goals and hierarchy forms of governance over open systems and self-governance (Newman, 
2001). This has encouraged conformity with central policy diktats at the expense of senior 
manager agency and local decision-making, and required senior managers to present their 
colleges as ‘auditable commodities’ (Shore and Wright 1999, 570, cited in Ball 2001, 11). In 
other words, a  culture of performativity has emerged - ‘a technology, a culture and a mode of 
regulation that employs judgements, comparisons and displays as means of control, attrition 
and change’ (Ball 2001, 2), leading to student commodification - a process whereby students 
are viewed as commodities, of financial or presentational value, at the expense of more 
legitimate educational decision-making. 
Lumby’s (2001) survey of college managers illustrated how senior managers felt unable to be 
self-critical because of the need to impress governors, and governors not being able to expose 
weaknesses to the FEFC in fear of a poor inspection report. This was compounded by an 
inadequate upward flow of communication in FE Colleges caused by senior college managers 
giving unconscious signals that ‘ideas, reactions and criticisms are not welcome’, a process 
which leads other managers in the hierarchy to filter what they say (Lumby 2001).  
The increased focus on rational goals (targets and PIs) and hierarchy forms of governance 
under New Labour led to P-A relations which were even more controlling. Rennie’s research 
(2003), for instance, found college activity, in response to the Ofsted inspection framework, to 
be more akin to a theatrical production or ‘performing performance’ (Smith and Bailey 2005) 
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than a process of college improvement. In other words, virtual colleges were constructed for 
show rather than for what is actually done, requiring actors to be coached and  rehearse lines, 
with the theatre (i.e. college) cleaned and props (i.e. reams of quality assurance documentation) 
at the ready. The performance carried on with the production and measurement of quantitative 
performance measures, which were of greater importance to both college managers and 
inspectors alike, than the explanation for the measurement itself (p.14), and thus its accuracy 
and validity. Similarly, the research of Kelly (2005) found that audits of quality in FE were 
more focussed on ensuring the quality of control systems, by making practices and behaviours 
visible and measurable, at the expense of the primary focus of colleges in terms of providing 
improvements in the quality of education (p.7); in other words Colleges were more focussed 
on the ‘rituals of verification’ than with genuinely reflecting on existing work practices. At the 
extreme the research of Coffield et al. (2008) uncovered colleges experiencing ‘external 
reproduction’ – where policy levers, rather than being mediated by senior managers, became 
the main objectives, leading to frequent reorganisations, remote management and excessive 
bureaucracy and control over professional practice (Coffield et al. 2008, 148). 
 
Similarly Boocock (2010), in a five-year ethnographic study of a single FE College uncovered 
senior managers focussing on goals and systems rather than on cultural change and innovation. 
Within this context, management was less concerned with improving efficiency and equity 
through an internal concern for developing the motivational structure of the college (and the 
productive potential of staff) than with conforming to and being legitimised by Ofsted and the 
LSC. Such a scenario was in line with what institutionalists refer to as ‘coercive isomorphism’: 
 
Organisational success depends on factors other than efficient 
coordination and control of productive activities. Independent of 
their productive efficiency, organisations which exist in highly 
elaborated institutional environments and succeed in becoming 
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isomorphic with these environments gain the legitimacy and 
resources needed to survive.   
                                                   (Meyer and Rowan 1977, 98) 
 
‘Coercive isomorphism’ in this case related to a larger organisation (both the local LSC and 
Ofsted) dominating a smaller one, leading to rituals of conformity (Dimaggio and Powell 1983) 
and a simultaneous reduced focus on developing technical activities (in particular systems and 
procedures) contingent on the particular needs of students and the local community. In other 
words, incomplete contracts, manifest in rules and constraints, seemingly limited the 
productivity of goal-oriented intrinsic motivation and professional values (Leibenstein 1978, 
260).   
 
Incomplete contracts have been further limited under the Coalition and the current 
Conservative government; in particular through a funding formula which no longer incentivises 
but directs senior managers towards young people at the expense of both adult learners and 
needs-based equity, and an inspectorate which maintains rituals of verification through short 
notice inspections. Whilst governments can ensure compliance through funding and inspection 
steers they are unable to forecast the outcomes of incentives or fine tune them to prevent 
inefficient and inequitable outcomes. (Fletcher et al. 2015, 173). ‘Measures of quality (also) 
ignore what is meaningful when what is meaningful is difficult to measure’ (Orr 2015, 175) 
 
The current Conservative administration’s policy agenda of area reviews as a precursor to a 
more localised and devolved approach to decision-making may provide progressive 
possibilities but the administration will need to go further than the planned focus on 
employability skills by including a regard for the needs of communities and disadvantaged 
adults at the local level too. It should also avoid replicating P-A solutions used at the national 
level at the local level due to the dysfunctional outcomes and incomplete contracts created. 
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Hodgson and Spours (2015) provide a broader template for addressing skills, needs-based 
equity and the wider benefits of education (for communities) at the local level through a shift 
from marketization and managerialism to area-based collaborative approaches in which FE 
colleges can use local knowledge to contribute to regional ecosystems. This would entail an 
emphasis on democratic local governance rather than central policy steering through inspection 
and funding incentives. In particular, colleges would be accountable, not to the diktats of 
central government, but to local communities, learners, employers, other education providers 
in the local area, and to regional and national professional associations. There would be a clear 
set of learning entitlements and devolved power at the local level, with this facilitated by 
change at all levels of governance – national, regional, local and institutional, and colleges 
liaising with wider social partners in a more collaborative and economically connected local 
learning system.  Coffield et al. (2008) similarly argue that local innovation could be achieved 
by replacing the ‘micro-managed, target-driven and quantitative culture of accountability’ 
(186) with bottom-up area-wide targets and a flexible funding mechanism (based on broadly 
based, rather than specific targets over three years) so that ‘translation of policy’ and resource 
allocation within colleges is in line with local circumstances rather than distant LSC directives.  
 
Crucially, more flexible P-A relations involving area-based collaborative approaches would 
resolve the problem of incomplete contracts (created by centralised funding and inspection 
diktats) as Colleges, in collaboration with local partners, would be able to develop curricula in 
line with the needs of disadvantaged students and adults, as well as the human capital needs of 
business, rather than centralised government diktats. The realisation of such a localised 
strategy, in valuing intrinsic motivation and professionalism as more powerful motivators in 
the Further Education sector than the self-interest assumed within principal-agent solutions, 
would be in line with communitarian theory.  Moral commitment, within this context, would 
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be achieved, not through incentives acting on self-interest, but through the college community 
imposing norms (patterns of behaviour, based on community values, such as reciprocity, co-
operation, work norms, moral norms) on the actions of individual managers and lecturers 
within the community (Etzioni, 1996 cited in Robertson et al. 2005). In particular, the sharing 
of power with local stakeholders and the empowerment and participation of middle managers 
and lecturers in decision-making (Robertson et al. 2005, 12) would  improve organisation 
design, managerial practices and teaching and learning through the utilisation of lecturer 
professionalism and intrinsic motivation in line with the needs of local businesses and 
communities. 
Price efficiency would also likely improve because of the reduction in transaction costs 
associated with policy based on higher trust (the costs involved in establishing, monitoring and 
enforcing the contract between the state purchasing agency and the FE College (Lane 1998, 
262), and between managers and lecturers. More specifically the high transaction costs relating 
to ‘time and energy put into translating external demands into internal systems of 
accountability’ (Coffield et al. 2008, 153) would be reduced. 
 
4. Principal-Agent relations between managers and lecturers 
The question arises, given the controlling principal-agent relations between policy-makers and 
senior managers discussed above: what is the impact of this, in turn, on principal-agent 
relations between senior managers, middle managers and lecturers? There is considerable 
research which suggests that external control was internally reproduced in FE Colleges in the 
early post-incorporation period (under the Conservative administration), leading to controlling 
P-A relations between senior managers, middle managers and lecturers (e.g. Hodkinson and 
Harvard, 1994; Randle and Brady 1997a, 1997b). The significance of this, research further 
suggests, is that that the professional knowledge and judgement of lecturers was challenged by 
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a culture of compliance and depoliticisation of the teaching profession, with such compliance  
imposed on lecturers by senior managers through ‘contrived collegiality’ (Bathmaker et al., 
2003).  
In particular, controlling P-A relations between college leaders, managers and lecturers led to 
lecturer professionalism being usurped by pressure on course teams to accept a dominant group 
ethos fully accepting of new managerialism (Avis 2002). Such managerialism  was based on 
economic rationalism, involving management control over professionals, and the replacement 
of public sector management with (what was considered) more efficient private sector practices 
(Clarke & Newman 1997). The importance of this, in terms of principal-agent relations, relates 
to the role of senior managers in the systematic disempowerment of lecturers and middle 
managers to determine what constitutes effective pedagogy for the needs of students, 
employers and wider society (Randle and Brady 1997b, 236).  Such a scenario is sometimes 
referred to as the deprofessionalisation (or proletarianisation or de-skilling) thesis (Randle and 
Brady 1997b).  
There is some debate on the role of middle managers in this process. Some research suggests 
that middle managers have acted as an ideological buffer  between managerialist notions of 
professionalism and those of lecturers (Gleeson and Shain 1999), resisting or even subverting 
policy through principled dissent (Coffield 2014) or infidelity (Wallace and Hoyle 2007). 
Tactics may be covert in nature, and include invisibility and impression management, as a 
means of prioritising ‘students and teachers over the systemic reporting structures and financial 
imperatives upon which colleges are built’ (Page 2015, 127). Other research suggests that 
middle manager have a limited capacity to resist senior manager diktats within hierarchical and 
authoritarian organisational structures (Hannagan, Lawton and Mallory 2007; Gleeson and 
Knight 2008; Boocock, 2011).  
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Under New Labour a new regime of inspection and target-setting tightened P-A relations 
through top-down management and a more bureaucratic audit culture (e.g. Hodkinson 2005a, 
2005b, Hodkinson et al. 2007) which further de-professionalised lecturers at the expense of 
intrinsic motivation and tacit knowledge. In particular, an emphasis on retention and 
achievement benchmarks by Ofsted and LSC led to on-going changes in systems and 
procedures, which reduced the morale of lecturers and created a ‘culture of the now’ (Scaife 
2004): a culture in which colleges respond quickly to the short-term needs of accountants and 
consultants, with little time or space for longer-term reflection or on-going research (Scaife 
2004, 1). In this way, productive motivational inputs derived from lecturer agency and the 
pedagogic judgement of lecturers (Nixon et al., 2008) were marginalised from the production 
process, with X-inefficiency (Leibenstein, 1978) the result of top-down, hierarchical decision-
making.  The audit culture, in focusing on compliance, also limited collaborative activity (of 
benefit to social capital) which required the co-ordination of people, systems and technology 
(Iszatt-White et al. 2004; Collinson and Collinson 2005) through leaders ‘sharing power, 
authority, knowledge and responsibility’ to create ‘synergistic, dynamic processes of active 
engagement’ (Jameson 2007, 11-12).   
The OTL (Observation of Teaching and Learning) process, driven by the Ofsted inspection 
framework, exemplifies the limitations of the audit culture created by controlling P-A relations. 
Under New Labour and the Coalition government, Observation of Teaching and Learning 
became the dominant quality assurance system for improving teaching and learning (Armitage 
et al. 2003). In Foucault’s (1980) terminology, it acted as an apparatus of control; in other 
words a top-down process which controls organisational life through the introduction of 
technicist skills and a culture of performativity (O’Leary, 2015). The teacher, within this 
context, has been reconstructed as state technician who uses assumed pedagogical practices 
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designed by Ofsted, with learning outcomes made visible and accountable, and alternative 
approaches to teaching and learning limited. (Maguire 2010, cited in O’Leary 2015, 16).  
 
The pressure on teachers to uncritically accept OTL has increased under the Coalition and 
Conservative administrations, through the replacement of the ‘satisfactory’ grade with 
‘requires improvement’ in the inspection framework. This has intensified the use of graded 
observations as a normalized, performative tool concerned with teacher accountability, and the 
lecturer response of rehearsed and conformist teaching and learning, at the expense of teacher 
development. In this way the regime of truth in OTL, created by Ofsted and reinforced through 
managerialism within FE colleges, has facilitated conformity to Ofsted rather than 
improvements in teaching and learning (O’Leary, 2015). To prevent a ‘pedagogy of 
compliance’ usurping ‘informed professional judgement’ (Alexander 2004), Boocock (2013) 
argues for reform of the observation process; in particular a shift from narrow definitions of 
‘good’ and ‘best’ practice and the competent practitioner model (Coffield and Edward 2009) 
towards: 
A less threatening and hierarchical OTL process which both embraces the 
tacit knowledge, professional values and subject-specific pedagogy of 
lecturers within their learning communities, and challenges lecturers (in their 
communities) through reference to pedagogical debates and research within 
the FE and wider literature (Boocock 2013, 499) 
 
The question arises as to how government policy should be changed to ameliorate the tight P-
A relations and incomplete contracts discussed above, so that the productive potential of 
lecturer and middle manager professionalism, intrinsic motivation and social capital may be 
utilised to achieve organisational goals. The current Conservative government’s planned policy 
of localism and devolution may not achieve this if P-A solutions are merely transferred from 
the national to local levels and, in particular, if Ofsted is retained in its current form as an 
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apparatus of state control. It will also not be achieved if the content of the curriculum is 
increasingly determined (as with apprenticeships) by employers rather than a range of 
stakeholders. This will particularly be the case from 2016/17 if employers (who will be 
expected to contribute £1 for every £2 of government spending devolved to local authorities) 
are able, as planned, to decide the content of apprenticeships, with this supported by the revised 
2015 Ofsted inspection framework which puts an increased emphasis on the responsiveness of 
FE providers to local skills training needs (Kaczmarczyk 2016). 
The more collaborative ecological policy outlined by Hodgson and Spours (2015), discussed 
in section 3, would provide more flexible principal-agent relations between policy makers and 
college leaders. This, in turn, would also provide an opportunity for more flexible internal 
principal-agent relations between managers and lecturers. In particular college leaders would 
be more able to support the ideal learning cultures and communities of practice argued for in 
the FE literature (James and Biesta, 2007) and encourage a shift in the nature of professionalism 
from neoliberal or managerialist professionalism, involving compliance, hierarchy, 
homogenous work procedures and low trust, to democratic professionalism, involving 
engagement in new developments in teaching and learning, and collaboration between lecturers 
and external stakeholders (students, parent and the wider community), focused on meeting the 
needs of the institution, local employers and the wider community (Taubman 2015). 
Such democratic professionalism would also require a fundamental shift away from tight 
coupling in the sector (i.e. simple-minded P-A solutions and narrow definitions of effective 
teaching and learning) to loose coupling; in other words a more specific emphasis on people, 
relationships and learning, rather than centrally determined rules, regulations and incentives 
within formal or bureaucratic control. In particular it would involve a loose relationship 
between lecturer, college and the centre, to allow adaptability and effectiveness (Orton and 
Weick 1990, cited in Goldspink, 2007, 40) within a complex and uncertain environment.  
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 Conclusion and recommendations  
Much of the FE literature on the post-incorporation FE sector suggests that government diktats, 
predicated on single-minded P-A theory, whilst effective at driving through and enforcing 
government policy, are less effective at improving efficiency and equity.  This is because 
centrally determined diktats (such as funding incentives and inspection frameworks) 
marginalise both local knowledge of labour markets and communities and the intrinsic 
motivation and tacit knowledge of college staff from the production process. The solution, 
research on FE suggests, is a shift from central control to a more loosely coupled FE sector 
including decentralised area-based collaborative approaches to decision-making. This would 
mitigate incomplete contracts, enabling manager and lecturer professionalism and tacit 
knowledge to be used (in consultation with local businesses and communities) to meet the 
human capital needs of local businesses, needs-based equity for disadvantaged students, and 
the wider benefits of education.  
The current Conservative administration aims to improve skills for employability through a 
policy of localism and devolution. If such localism is to be effective far more local autonomy 
will be required than has so far been granted in terms of funding and curriculum delivery 
(Gravatt, 2014). In particular,  an effective policy of localism will require a significant shift 
away from the current low-trust Principal Agent solutions manifest in funding and monitoring 
systems, driven by marketization, managerialism, ‘targets and terror’ (Propper, 2010, p. 34, 
cited in Keep, 2016, p. 4), and control at the level of a national agency. More recognition of 
local knowledge will be required, and trust in subordinate actors and local stakeholders to use 
this knowledge to meet local needs. To facilitate this will require the development of new 
mechanisms to enable localities to confederate, the DfE and BIS to create more flexible 
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accountability arrangements with localities, and government to distribute or share strategy with 
localities through new forms of governance (Keep, 2016, p. 8). These new forms of governance 
and accountability arrangements, this paper argues, should also have a broader remit than skills 
for employability at the local level, to include a concern for needs-based equity for adults and 
the wider benefits of education to local communities.  
The review of the FE literature in this paper also suggests that the current Conservative 
government is unlikely to achieve its goal of increased skills for employability, if its policy of 
localism creates a local version of the ineffective national supply-led approach to skills 
implemented by previous administrations (Keep, 2016). This may particularly be the case if 
single-minded P-A solutions shift from the national to the local level in terms of skill targets 
provided to local providers which are broken down according to skill levels and vocational 
areas in an attempt to match the supply of skills with demand. Such a policy at a local level 
would likely lead to the same incomplete contacts, gaming behaviours and unintended 
consequences that national funding and inspection targets previously created, and fail to deliver 
the looser coupling (i.e. more flexible P-A relations) required for managers and lecturers to 
develop the curriculum in line with the needs of businesses, disadvantaged adults and local 
communities. 
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